Abstract: This paper gives the definitions of an extra superincreasing sequence and an anomalous subset sum, and proposes a fast quantum-safe asymmetric cryptosystem called JUOAN2. The new cryptosystem is based on an additive multivariate permutation problem (AMPP) and an anomalous subset sum problem (ASSP) which parallel a multivariate polynomial problem and a shortest vector problem respectively, and composed of a key generator, an encryption algorithm, and a decryption algorithm. The authors analyze the security of the new cryptosystem against the Shamir minima accumulation point attack and the LLL lattice basis reduction attack, and prove it to be semantically secure (namely IND-CPA) on the assumption that AMPP and ASSP have no subexponential time solutions. Particularly, the analysis shows that the new cryptosystem has the potential to be resistant to quantum computing attack, and is especially suitable to the secret communication between two mobile terminals in maneuvering field operations under any weather. At last, an example explaining the correctness of the new cryptosystem is given.
Introduction
The MH knapsack asymmetric cryptosystem [1] is frangible individually to the Shamir minima accumulation point finding which attacks a public key [2] and to the LLL lattice basis reduction which attacks a ciphertext [3] [4] [5] , but it delivers crucial enlightenment to succeeding designers of fast asymmetric cryptosystems. Besides, the REESSE1+ and JUOAN asymmetric cryptosystems deliver recent enlightenment to designers of quantum-resistant cryptosystems based on multivariate problems and lattice problems [6] [7] .
In this paper, we intend to design a fast quantum-safe asymmetric cryptosystem which will be based on a multivariate problem as well as a lattice problem, and will use an extra superincreasing sequence as well as an anomalous subset sum.
Throughout the paper, unless otherwise specified, the sign % means "modulo", lg x denotes the logarithm of x to the base 2, b i does the negative value of a bit b i , and x does the order of an element x % M. Without ambiguity, "% M " is usually omitted in expressions. 
Several Definitions and Related Properties
k + 1) A i >  i -1 j =1 (k + i -j) A j .
Definition 2:
Assume that b 1 b n  {0, 1} n is a plaintext block, r 1 r n  {0, 1} n is a random noise, M is an integral modulus, and
} is an integer sequence (namely an ordered set). Then
, and when r 1 r n = 0 and L i does not exist there, Ṩ degenerates to a subset sum
Notice that in Definition 2, {C 1 , …, C n } is not necessarily an extra superincreasing sequence or a superincreasing sequence.
Property 2:
For any positive integer m  n, if randomly select m elements from an extra superincreasing sequence {A 1 , …, A n }, and construct a subsequence (namely an ordered subset) {Ax 1 , , Ax m }, then an anomalous subset sum Ṣ = m Ax 1 + (m -1) Ax 2 +  + Ax m is uniquely determined, that is, the mapping from Ṣ to {Ax 1 , , Ax m } is one-to-one.
Definition 3:
In an asymmetric cryptosystem, the parameter ℓ(i) in the key transform is called the lever function, if it has the following features [6] [7] :
 ℓ(.) is an injection from integers to integers, its domain is [1, n] , and codomain [1, M) . Let Ł n represent the collection of all injections from the domain to the codomain, then ℓ(.)  Ł n and |Ł n |  A n n = n (n -1)  1.  The mapping between i and ℓ(i) is established randomly without an analytical formula, so every time a public key is generated, the function ℓ(.) is distinct.  There does not exist any dominant or special mapping from ℓ(.) to a public key.
 An attacker has to consider all the arrangements of the sequence {ℓ(1), , ℓ(n)} when extracting a related private key from a public key. Thus, if n is large enough, it is infeasible for the attacker to search the arrangements exhaustively.  A receiver owning a private key only needs to consider the accumulative sum of n elements in {ℓ(1), , ℓ(n)} when recovering a related plaintext from a ciphertext. Thus the time complexity of decryption is polynomial in n, and the decryption is feasible. Obviously, there is the large amount of calculation on ℓ(.) at "a public terminal", and the small amount of calculation on ℓ(.) at "a private terminal".
Property 3 (Indeterminacy of ℓ(.)): Let
C i  (A i + W ℓ(i))δ (% M) with δ = 1, M an integral modulus, and ℓ(i)   = {e 1 , …, e n | e i  2n} for i = 1, …, n. Then  W (W   M)  (1, M) and  x, y, z (x  y  z)  [1, n],  when ℓ(x) + ℓ(y) = ℓ(z), there is ℓ(x) + W  + ℓ(y) + W   ℓ(z) + W  (% M);  when ℓ(x) + ℓ(y)  ℓ(z), there always exist C x  A′ x + W′ ℓ′(x) (% M), C y  A′ y + W′ ℓ′(y) (% M), and C z  A′ z + W′ ℓ′(z) (% M) such that ℓ′(x) + ℓ′(y)  ℓ′(z) (% M) with the constraint A′ z < or  M / 3.
New Asymmetric Cryptosystem
The new cryptographic scheme includes three algorithms separately for key pair, encryption, and decryption.
Key Generation Algorithm
Suppose that n is the bit-length of a plaintext block or a symmetric key, and let ñ = 3n / 2. This algorithm is employed by a third-party authority or a user who needs to hold a private key exclusively.
INPUT: an integer ñ.
S1
: Randomly generate an extra superincreasing sequence {A 1 , , A ñ }.
S2: Find an integer
Notice that the lever values {ℓ(1), …, ℓ(ñ)} is discarded, and a random permutation of the subscript integers {1, …, ñ} may be considered.
Definition 4: Given a public key (
with {A i } an extra superincreasing sequence and ℓ(i) from  = {e 1 , …, e ñ | e i  2ñ} for i = 1, …, ñ is called an additive multivariate permutation problem (AMPP). It is not difficult to see an additive multivariate permutation problem is a form of a multivariate polynomial problem. Notice that the parameter ñ in Definition 4 may be substituted with n.
Encryption Algorithm
INPUT: an integer ñ; a public key (
an n-bit plaintext block or symmetric key
where b n+1 b ñ  {0, 1} n / 2 is a random padding.
S2: Yield a random noise r 1 …r ñ  {0, 1} ñ .
S6: If i  1 then goto S4; else prepare outputting. OUTPUT: a ciphertext Ṩ.
Apparently, Ṩ may be written as Ṩ  
Given a public key ({C 1 , …, C ñ }, M) and a ciphertext Ṩ, seeking a related plaintext
It should be noted that the parameter ñ in Definition 5 may be substituted with n.
Decryption Algorithm
INPUT: an integer ñ; a private key (
If i  1 and Ṣ  0 then goto S4.
S6: If Ṣ  0 then goto S2; else prepare outputting.
OUTPUT: a related plaintext b 1 b ñ containing the original plaintext b 1 b n . This algorithm can always terminate normally as long as Ṩ is a true ciphertext.
Preliminary Analysis of Security
The analysis of security of the new asymmetric cryptosystem should cover three aspects.
In this section, we replace the parameter ñ with n for writing convenience, which will not influence the correctness of analysis results.
Resistant to Shamir Minima Accumulation Point Attack
In the new asymmetric cryptosystem, the key transform is
with {A i } an extra superincreasing sequence.
The above key transform is of a multivariate problem, and utterly different to the MH transform c i  a i W (% M) for i = 1, …, n with {a i } a superincreasing sequence. Therefore, the Shamir minima accumulation point attack [2] will be ineffective on public keys in the new cryptosystem.
Resistant to LLL Lattice Basis Reduction Attack
In the MH knapsack cryptosystem [1] , a superincreasing sequence {a 1 , …, a n } -{1, 2, …, 2 n -1 } for example, is a private key, a sequence {C 1 , …, C n | C i  a i W (% M)} is a public key, a bit string
n is a plaintext block, and a subset sum S = 
Corresponding to the form of a subset sum, a related knapsack density is expressed as [3] 
When D is less than 0.6463, and even 0.9408, a related plaintext b 1 b n can be recovered from a ciphertext S through the LLL lattice basis reduction algorithm [3] [4] [5] . Therefore, the MH knapsack cryptosystem is insecure.
In the new asymmetric cryptosystem, an anomalous subset sum is
Corresponding to the form of an anomalous subset sum, a related knapsack density is
It is should be noted that the maximal value of every L i on a bit string b 1 b n is n -i + 1, and thus the maximal bit-length of every L i is lg L i = lg (n -i + 1) which must be considered in the LLL lattice basis reduction algorithm.
When n = 10 at most, Ḍ will be larger than 1. Hence, the LLL lattice basis reduction attack is ineffective on ciphertexts in the new cryptosystem.
Having Potential to Be Resistant to Quantum Computing Attack
It is well known that asymmetric cryptosystems based on integer factorization problems, discrete logarithm problems, or elliptic curve discrete logarithm problems -RSA, ElGamal, and ECC for example will be insecure on quantum computers [8] [9] . ) unique shortest vector problem (SVP) [12] , where n is the dimension of a lattice. The corollary indicates the unique SVP will be secure on quantum computers as long as a polynomial time algorithm for a non-negligible part of instances of the average case SSP is not found. The unique SVP as a lattice problem has important cryptographic applications -a cryptosystem by Regev for example [13] . Consequently, lattice-based cryptography is on the list of quantum-resistant cryptographic techniques which is given by NIST [14] . In addition, multivariate polynomial cryptography is included by the list [14] .
The new asymmetric cryptosystem is based on the hardnesses of a multivariate permutation problem and an anomalous subset sum problem which are separately equivalent to a multivariate polynomial problem and a shortest vector problem, and naturally, it has the potential to resist quantum computing attack.
Proof of Semantic Security

Definition 7:
A cryptosystem is said to be semantically secure if an adversary who knows the encryption algorithm of the cryptosystem and is in possession of a ciphertext is unable to determine any information about the related plaintext [15] .
It is subsequently demonstrated that semantic security is equivalent to another definition of security called ciphertext indistinguishability [16] . If a cryptosystem has the property of indistinguishability, then an adversary will be unable to distinguish a pair of ciphertexts based on the two plaintexts encrypted by a challenger.
A chosen plaintext attack (CPA) is an attack model for cryptanalysis which presumes that the attacker has the capability to choose arbitrary plaintexts to be encrypted and obtain the corresponding ciphertexts that are expected to decrease the security of a cryptosystem [17] .
Definition 8: A cryptosystem is said to be IND-CPA (indistinguishable under chosen plaintext attack), namely semantically secure against chosen plaintext attack, if the adversary cannot determine which of the two plaintexts was chosen by a challenger, with probability significantly greater than 1/2, where 1/2 means the success rate of random guessing [17] [18] .
For a probabilistic asymmetric cryptosystem based on computational security, indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack is illuminated by a game between an adversary and a challenger, where the adversary is regarded as a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine, which means that it must complete the game and output a guess within a polynomial number of steps.
Notice that for the new asymmetric cryptosystem, an adversary may be also regarded as a probabilistic subexponential time Turing machine since no subexponential time solution to AMPP or ASSP is found so far.
Theorem 1: The new asymmetric cryptosystem is indistinguishable under chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA) on the assumption that AMPP and ASSP cannot be solved in subexponential time.
Proof:
Let E(k p , ) represents the encryption of a message (plaintext)  under the public key k p .
A game between an adversary and a challenger is given as follows.
 The challenger calls the key generation algorithm with the parameter ñ, obtains a key pair (k p , k s ), publishes k p = ({C 1 , …, C ñ }, M) to the adversary, and retains k s for himself.
 The adversary may perform any number of encryptions or other compatible operations, which will give the adversary a weak advantage over tossing a coin.
 Eventually, the adversary chooses any two distinct n-bit plaintexts ( 0 ,  1 ), and submits them to the challenger.
 The challenger selects a bit x  [0, 1] uniformly at random, and sends the challenge ciphertext  The adversary is free to perform any number of additional computations or encryptions. Finally, it outputs a guess for the value of x. Therefore, it is needed to analyze the probability of hitting x.
Because the intricacies AMPP and ASSP have no subexponential time solutions, neither can the adversary acquire a private key from a public key ({C 1 , …, C ñ }, M), nor can directly solve the equation
It is known from the encryption algorithm that one identical plaintext b 1 b n may be mapped to Thus the probability that the adversary hits x by guessing is only
) is a negligible function of n. Hence, for every (nonzero) polynomial function poly(n) (notice that in the new cryptosystem, it may be a subexponential function), there exists n 0 such that 1 / (2 n / 2 ṟ(L 1 )) < 1 / poly(n) for all n > n 0 .
In summary, the new asymmetric cryptosystem is indistinguishable under chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA). 
Conclusion
We design an asymmetric cryptosystem which can do encryption and decryption quickly by separately using a public key and a related private key.
The new asymmetric cryptosystem is analyzed to be resistant to the Shamir minima accumulation point attack and the LLL lattice basis reduction attack, and moreover proved to be semantically secure (namely IND-CPA) on the assumption that AMPP and ASSP have no subexponential time solutions.
The new cryptosystem is promised to be resistant to quantum computing attack because AMPP is equivalent to a multivariate polynomial problem, and ASSP is essentially a shortest vector problem.
Moreover, the new cryptosystem is especially suitable to the secret communication between two mobile terminals in maneuvering field operations under any weather for it has little computation and quick speed.
In future, relevant work, including analysis of the cryptosystem's non-malleability, analysis of the cryptosystem's security against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack, analysis of uniqueness of a plaintext from a ciphertext, analysis of time complexity of the algorithms, discussion of the function ṟ(L 1 ), experiments on the LLL lattice basis reduction, comparison with other asymmetric cryptosystems, etc, still needs to be done. 
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A.2 Encryption
Assume that a public key is ({2034, 3376, 134, 88, 2402, 746, 2833, 607}, 3581), and a plaintext block is b 1 …b 8 = 10101001.
Yield a random noise r 1 …r 8 = 00100111.
Compute 
A.3 Decryption
Assume that a private key is ({2, 4, 11, 29, 76, 199, 523, 1368}, 1127, 2718, 3581) , and a ciphertext is Ṩ = 3204.
